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I. INTRODUCTION 
Concern for natural resource scarcity, initially agri- 
cultural land, goes back centuries in time. Many publications 
on public policies embodying economic analysis date from Adam 
Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill in the 
latter 18th and early 19th Centuries. Further modernization 
of concepts of natural resource scarcity occurred later in the 
19th Century. Among important writing were W.S. Jevons on coal, 
George Perkins March on ecology, Henry George on land rent, and 
the founders of the European and American conservation movements 
on forests, water and agricultural land. 
In the first half of the 20th Century, natural resource 
scarcity doctrine, including minerals, was extended in the 
Western world. The leaders were conservationists and govern- 
ment officials. Policies to cope with scarcity were embodied 
in major laws and policies concerning public lands, taxes and 
government investment. Minerals scarcity concepts became sig- 
nificant. In some countries, they were the basis for preferen- 
tial tax laws, governmental reserves, and public assistance in 
geology, exploration and development. Foreign investments by 
companies from developed countries occurred or expanded. 
Minerals availability/scarcity concerns have been even 
more emphasized following World War 11. The reasons are in- 
creased industrialization and dependence of economic growth and 
national security on minerals use, depletion, and foreign supplies. 
Foreign investments by multi-national companies in the developing 
countries have expanded enormously. Governments and public cor- 
porations have become heavily involved in minerals activities. 
Natural resource events became even more prominent in 
contemporary public affairs during the 1 9 7 0 ' s .  There have been 
explosions of new interests, with major policy implications. 
Because of new developments, simple extensions of former economic 
trends are no longer appropriate. One event is the initial 
promise and then growing disillusion and distrust over wide- 
spread use of nuclear electric power to overcome possible 
scarcity of fossil fuels. A second is the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other cartels. More 
generally, the quest for a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) has changed the relations between developing and developed 
countries, particularly in the field of exploitation and supply 
of minerals. A fourth event is potential availability of vast 
mineral resources from the oceans at economical costs. A fifth 
is the phenomenally successful environmental-ecology movements 
in the U.S. and - perhaps to a lesser extent - in other countries. 
In profound and sweeping legislation, they have eliminated vast 
mineral resources from economic availability and have increased 
costs from present reserves; these have fostered scarcity in 
mineral supplies. Some of these and related events have been 
novel and all have been potent. 
The recent developments call for not merely extending 
scarcity doctrine along conventional lines but for re-thinking 
what we have learned earlier about economic aspects of physical 
scarcities and substantially enlarging the scope of our analysis. 
IIASA, in its System and Decision Sciences Area (SDS), has 
undertaken a modest research effort, focused on Europe during 
the past 2 or 3  decades, The present working paper is an ex- 
ploration and discussion. 
11. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives of the research effort are as 
follows : 
Task 1 :  To formulate minerals scarcity concepts and 
measures appropriate for the long .term for Europe and indi- 
vidual European countries. 
Task 2: To measure trends in minerals supply scarcity 
in the world and Europe, as these affect European countries. 
Task 3 :  To account for and explain the contemporary 
minerals scarcity trends in terms of basic forces. 
Task 4: To make economic projections of European economic 
change for the next decades, and to reach conclusions concern- 
ing future costs and other conditions of minerals supply for 
European countries. 
111. STATIC ECONOMIC THEORY OF INCREASING ECONOMIC SCARCITY OF 
MINERALS 
Our concern is the increasing economic scarcity of minerals 
and their products -- ores, fuels, metals, bulk fertilizers, etc. 
The basic notion is that these are essential for economic welfare 
and growth; their economic scarcity could impair welfare and 
development. 
To help define this notion of increasing economic scarcity 
of minerals in terms of effects on basic economic variables, we 
begin with an illustration of two economies, which differ o n l y  
in minerals endowment. 
Parable of Two Economies 
Vizualize two equal size areas, identical in every respect 
except mineral resource endowments. Area "A" has almost un- 
limited mineral resources of highest grade, and "S" has very 
large but relatively fewer mineral resources of highest grade. 
Both have virtually unlimited minerals of lower grade. We now 
put identical people in both areas -- half of each twin pair in 
each area. They become Economy A and Economy S, isolated from 
each other., without international trade. 
For 1000  years, the two economies grow identically. Marginal 
cost of mineral product supplies relative to demands are the same 
in both economies. Both enjoy plentitude of mineral resources of 
highest grade, relative to demands. The more limited ultimate 
mineral resources endowment of highest grade in Economy S have 
not yet become economically relevent. The two economies, we 
observe, are identical in year 1000 :  in GNP and GNP per person, 
capital in place, industry composition, labor force, prices 
(including wage rates, interest rates, land rents), marginal 
productivities of factors, etc., etc. Knowledge is complete in 
both economies, there are no uncertainties, there is perfect 
competition, societies and cultures are identical. Economic 
rents for mineral resources in place in this condition of economic 
plentitude of mineral resources are zero, assuming no transport 
cost. 
After 1000 years, it becomes apparent in Economy S that 
highest grade mineral resources would, at then rate of use, be 
exhausted in another 100  years or so. Recourse must be to re- 
sources of a lesser economic grade, which are available in enor- 
mous quantities. In the latter part of the 100  year period the 
highest grade resources in S will command a Ricardian economic 
rent, equal to the difference between marginal cost of a standard 
unit of minerals supply from highest grade resources and the 
lesser grade. A standard unit is one which has equal economic 
efficiency in use, no matter what its source. In Economy A, 
on the other hand, highest grade mineral resources exist suf- 
ficient for thousands of years of production at then rates of 
use, and there are no economic rents to mineral resources. 
In summary: for the first 1000 years, resource plentitude 
was constant in both economies. There was no economic scarcity 
of mineral resources. In the next 100 years, increasing scarcity 
entered in Economy S, but not in Economy A. 
We compare the two economies in the year 1100 :  cet.paribus: 
-- Real GNP, total and per capita, are lower in S. 
-- Growth rate of real GNP is lower in S than A. 
-- Prices of minerals products in standard units 
(such as tons of crude steel, barrels of gaso- 
line, etc.) relative to all prices are higher 
in S, assuming no trade. 
-- Capital formation is lower in S. 
-- Real wage rates and interest rates are lower in S. 
-- Marginal and average productivities of labor and 
capital are lower in S, if the propensity to save 
is positive. 
-- Minerals utilization in standard units is lower 
in S, as noted above. 
-- Better mineral resources command economic rents 
in S, as noted above. 
Cet.paribus, the effects of increasing economic scarcity in 
S are that minerals supplies in standard units have become more 
costly and their real prices have risen. Because of this, fewer 
standard units are used. This has reduced productivity of other 
factors of production and has lowered their real prices. The 
GNP is lower and growing less rapidly. Cet.paribus, all of this 
is directly due to a single, significant economic limitation in 
supply, in this case decline in physical quality of marginal 
mineral resources. 
In our simplified case to this point we have permitted no 
divergent influences other than increasing minerals scarcity 
from declining physical grades. There were no divergent un- 
certainties, technological changes, monopolies, different 
evolutions of people, international trade, etc., nor repercus- 
sions from these. For example, monopoly over the declining 
volume of best resources did not occur nor aggravate (increase) 
the scarcity effects in Economy S. Also, we have confined our- 
selves to "first order" effects. For example, we excluded the 
possibility that the decline in mineral resource quality might 
trigger favorable technological change and international trade 
which might overcome first order scarcity effects. 
The parable represents a classical Ricardian-type economic 
view of mineral scarcity. It reflects only physical limits 
converted into economic scarcity. The only societal melioration 
is substitution away from a now more expensive input in static 
(parametrically invariant) production or utility functions. In 
the economic theory of real dynamic societies, neither of these 
limitations are present. First, single or multiple conditions 
other than physical limits could create or intensify economic 
s c a r c i t i e s  o f  m i n e r a l  r e s o u r c e s .  Second, changes i n  s o c i a l  and 
t e c h n i c a l  pa ramete r s  cou ld  m i t i g a t e  s c a r c i t i e s  from p h y s i c a l  o r  
o t h e r  c ause s .  
I V .  MINERALS FLOW CHART 
I t  i s  u s e f u l  f o r o u r  con- 
c e p t s  and measurement d i s c u s s i o n  
t o  c o n s t r u c t  and d i s c u s s  a  
m i n e r a l s  f low c h a r t .  W e  have 
se t  up f o u r  s t a g e s .  I n  e ach ,  
t h e  p r oduc t i on  a c t i v i t y  and 
p roduc t  markets  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d .  
P roduc t ion  a c t i v i t y  i s  i n  r e c -  
t a n g l e s ,  marke t s  ( i n c l u d i n g  
r e l e v a n t  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n )  a r e  
i n  c i r c u l a r  o r  oblong f i g u r e s .  
Each p r o d u c t i v e  a c t i v i t y  and 
market  i s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
r e c o g n i z a b l e  m i n e r a l s  a c t i v i t y .  
"Produc t ion  I ,  Find ing  
Reserves"  i n v o l v e s  mapping, 
e x p l o r a t i o n ,  d r i l l i n g ,  i d e n t i -  
MARKET 2 
Rcsvvts  
f y i n g  and e s t i m a t i n g  o f  m ine ra l  
r e s e r v e s .  I t  buys and employs 
p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  from Market A 
( f o r  example, bonus and r o y a l t y  
payments f o r  o i l  l e a s e s )  and 
a l s o  employs l a b o r  ( L ) ,  c a p i t a l  
(K) and purchases  m a t e r i a l s  
and e l e c t r i c a l  energy  ( I )  . I n  
o u r  c h a r t ,  t h e  r e s e r v e s  which 
a r e  i d e n t i f i e d  a r e  s o l d  t o  
companies i n  Market I ;  t h i s  
occu r s  e x t e n s i v e l y  i n  m i n e r a l  
f u e l s  and f o r  some me ta l  re- 
s e r v e s .  F r e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  company 
which f i n d s  t h e  r e s e r v e s  avo id s  
Market I and u t i l i z e s  them it- 
s e l f ,  i n  Produc t ion  I1 Mining. 
"Produc t ion  11: Mining" 
i s  deve lop ing ,  d r i l l i n g ,  
e x t r a c t i n g ,  m i l l i n g ,  concen- 
t r a t i n g  a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  t r a d i -  
t iona lmin ingcompany .  The 
output- -crude  o i l ,  washed c o a l ,  
o r e s  and concen t ra tes - -goes  t o  
Market I1 a s  c rude  m i n e r a l s .  
Market 11, u n l i k e  Market I ,  i s  
worldwide and augmented by 
impor t s  and reduced by e x p o r t s  
and i n v o l v e s  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .  
"Production 111: Refining" transforms crude minerals into 
refined ones--petroleum products, coke, steel, copper, aluminium, 
etc. Sometimes, of course, this stage is by-passed, when the 
crude mineral from the preceding stage is ready for final use-- 
e.g. coal, sand and gravel. More frequently Production I11 is 
a major economic activity, which is often carried out in or near 
industrialized regions after imports of the crude minerals. It 
produces recognizable products for Market I11 which, again, is 
subject to transportation and foreign trade. 
Market I11 is the terminus of the mineral supply activities. 
Finally, Production IV is a variety of non-minerals supply 
activities. One is manufacture of petrochemicals, metal products, 
glass, finished fertilizers. Other activities are construction, 
domestic trade, etc. Production IV and Market IV are shown only 
to complete the description of the minerals flow chain; they are 
the ultimate demanders of mineral products from Market I11 (and, 
for some minerals from Market 11). The output from Production IV 
goes to a residual market of "final goods". 
Our discussion has omissions. New scrap is recovered in 
Production IV and old scrap in the form of discarded consumer 
and investment goods from Market IV; the figures for some metals 
are large. These go back into Production I11 for reprocessing 
and refining. Very substantial transportation occurs in all 
numbered markets expect I. In some countries, domestic mineral 
flows do not exist or are small, needs are satisfied by imports 
to Markets 11, 111, and IV. Stock changes sometimes act very 
powerfully. Japan drew down its copper stocks by 270,000 tons 
in 1974, thereby reducing net imports from 370,000 tons in 1973 
to 13,000 in 1974. Prices onthe London Metals Exchange collapsed 
by 40% in 1975. 
Comments Relative to the Flow Chart and the Parable of 
Two Economies. 
From the flow chart, we now see how simple and abstract 
were the classical conceptions of economic scarcity from-physical 
limits. For Malthus, it was limit in the total amount of re- 
serves-- a fixed supply in Market I. For Ricardo, it was a 
decline in the economic grade of reserves, the best used first 
in Market I. Ricardian-type scarcity is more interesting, and 
is the one employed in the parable of two economies. 
Ricardian-type scarcity hi. ar 
introduces as an assumed fact Gsl por Uait 
that Market I is characterized 
in long-term by an upward sloping 
PJ supply curve, after point L. 
Growth of the economy moves 
quantity demanded to the right. pL 
Depletion shifts the entire 
supply curve leftward. The re- P, 
sult is increasing economic 
- - -  
- - -  
.-- 
scarcity of resources relative 1 L Qur*r'd/ 
to economic growth, reflected in costs and prices per unit; of 
P,,P and P for successive time periods 1.2, and 3 respectively. 2 3 
Compare the Ricardian scarcity of the parable with the 
chart. Let us accept the Ricardian premise concerning Market I 
for a moment. Then we are denied the opportunity to avoid 
scarcity in Market I and in the previous stages. Thus in 
Market I, we are simply given a stock and not permitted to learn 
that we may have been using less economical reserves earlier 
than the better reserves. Our knowledge is complete and perfect 
concerning not only locations, but also the economic efficiency 
of producing from all resources over the nation. Nor may we 
learn anything about improving the efficiency of markets. Nor 
does growth and spread of society create significant economies 
of social scale. 
Production I activity (Finding Reserves) does not exist in 
this premise. If it did, we might find reserves of which we had 
no knowledge. Also, of cQurse, improved economic efficiency in 
finding reserves cannot occur from accumulation of knowledge or 
technical change, since there is no reserve finding activity. 
The prior "Market A: Property Rights" cannot, in an eco- 
nomic sense, operate or improve on the Ricardian model premise. 
If it did, then good resources previously blocked from recovery 
or use by Crown reservations or monopoly grants could become 
available. Or the reverse could occur and aggrevate scarcity. 
Government could abridge exploration and reserve finding of 
minerals on domestic public lands; they could limit the access 
to ocean resources; and could impose environmental impact 
conditions relative to existing property rights of use. 
Finally, improvement in social arrangements and institutions 
or in quality or decline in cost of the factors of production L, 
K, and Iexert no influence. Since there is no Production I 
sector, more or better scientists, computers, satellites, radio- 
active tracers, ocean technologies, etc. are irrelevant. 
Turn now to the production and market stages subsequent to 
Market I. In the Ricardian model, this seems to simplify to 
the chart: 
There are no intervening stages. All of the intervening 
economy, between minerals reserve endowments and GNP are sub- 
sumed in constant returns to scale to labor, capital, and 
minerals of constant quality. But, since the economic quality 
of the minerals factor of production declines by assumption, 
then the economy experiences d e c l i n i n g  returns to scale. Pro- 
duction stages 2,3 and 4, and Markets 2,3, and 4 disappear into 
insignificance. They are all within the rectangle of economy 
wide constant returns production functions, which become 
diminishing returns in the presence of economic scarcity of 
minerals. 
In economies of the parable, there is no opportunity to 
overcome the premise of Market I of increasing cost of minerals. 
Nothing avails, there are no gains in or from knowledge, social 
arrangements, technology in thousands of industrial sectors, 
scale, reclamation of scrap, changes in GNP composition, capital 
accumulation, nor education. 
V.SOCI0-TECHNICAL CHANGES 
We identify some of these major categories of influences-- 
parametric changes--which are in fact present in r e a l  economies 
to aggravate or overcome incipient economic scarcities of 
minerals in today's world. 
(i) Creating or intensifying scarcities: 
o Cartels and other market control, such as OPEC or its 
progenitors, Texas Railroad Commission and Interstate 
Oil Compact Commission. 
o Certain doctrines of the New International Economic 
Order which may restrict development and production 
of minerals in developing countries and from oceans, 
or tend to change supply conditions. 
o Governmental and inter-governmental obstructions or 
restrictions on minerals product developments, such 
as ocean minerals and nuclear materials facilities. 
o Environmental pollution regulations, and land with- 
drawals for preservation. 
o Economic growth and other socio-technical parametric 
changes. 
(ii) Meliorating scarcities: 
o Accumulation of knowledge, particularly scientific, 
technical and economic. 
o Innovation, minerals discovery, recycling, substitutions, 
other technological change. 
o Economic growth and economies of social scale. 
o International trade. 
o Capital accumulation. 
o Other social parametric changes--materials savings, 
culture, tastes, organizations. 
The lists and flow chart show that it is too simple to view 
economic scarcity of minerals as only a question of declines in 
physical grades of mineral resources. Other phenomena in the 
real world both create and overcome mineral scarcities. More- 
over, these influencesmaybe present in all industrial stages 
and markets. 
We are satisfied from previous work, especially publications 
of Resources for the Future over the past twenty years, that the 
classical Ricardian (and Malthusian) doctrines of increasing 
scarcity of minerals from physical limits are not valid in the 
20th centry societies. Of course, they are right that the world 
is limited in physical extent and properties. But in our time, 
economic and social dynamics beyond their conceptions are of 
much greater force on long term minerals supply for economic 
welfare and growth. They viewed the economic system of nations 
as a neutral and relatively static (and static-wise efficient) 
mechanism for converting existing, known physical conditions 
into economic welfare and growth. It is not sensible that we 
today should see our economies as neutral or static (or 
always efficient) relative to physical world changes. Nor should 
we assume that social change forces are less influential than 
physical ones for increasing scarcity of minerals. It is signifi- 
cant that same or similar categories appear in both lists, above. 
The multiple forces which operate to increase or mitigate scarcity 
interact in complex ways -- simultaneously, with lags, and as 
individual phenomena rather than as economic aggregates. 
Environmental Externalities 
Environmental restrictions and limits are perhaps the major 
long-term minerals scarcity phenomena of our generation. Recently 
they have greatly restricted minerals supply. For example, the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines and Minerals industry complain that more 
than two thirds of the U.S. public domain (which is one-third of 
the U.S. land area) are no longer open to minerals exploration 
and development. In the flow chart, this is a restriction on 
property rights in Market A. As another example, in Market I 
and in Production I and 11, billions of tons of U.S. coal re- 
serves are proscribed from production and use because of high 
sulfur content, steep ground gradients, or restrictions on 
removal of overburden. Substantial U.S. restrictions have been 
laid on outer continental shelf and Artic oil and gas, iron ore, 
shale and other mining. These are restrictions in the supply 
from Market I or the parameters of Production 11: Mining, in 
the flow chart; they increase costs of production. Similar 
phenomena have occured in European Nations, although of a some- 
what different nature. First, in most of the European countries 
and Japan, only a limited part of the final mineral supply is 
extracted domestically. To a large degree, their needs are 
covered by imports of crude minerals, thereby often 'exporting' 
the environmental problems connected with the first production 
stages to countries with less stringent environmental rules. 
Second, the processing and refining of minerals in Europe mainly 
takes place indenselypopulated industrial regions (for instance 
the German Ruhr area). Here, environmental considerations have 
played an important role since the beginning of these activities, 
and have led to a gradually increasing legislation with respect 
to pollution. 
Nevertheless, many of the policies were introduced in a 
crusade of environmental reform during the past decade, without 
explicit consideration of the effects upon minerals availability, 
scarcity, and costs. It is necessary to take account of the 
environmental protection influence in order to interpret the 
scarcity/availability record since the 1960's. Understanding 
this phenomena is important: in the next decade or so, societies 
will inevitably try to integrate the recent profound changes in 
attitudes into revised and stable public policies. 
Now that we have 'discovered' externalities as being very 
important, there is need to improve the concepts of minerals 
scarcity and externalities with respect to each other. First, 
there is a large array of external environmental costs--polluted 
air and water and land disfigurement--which were generally 
neglected in earlier economics work. Obviously, these costs 
should be included in society's benefit-cost accounting. Second, 
itis particular environmental and other 'goods and services' which 
have been alleged to be especially subject to adverse impacts 
from minerals supply expansion: pure water supply, nature pres- 
ervation amenities, privacy, genetic capital stock, and others. 
These are of special concern in our minerals analysis. Third, 
the widely-held ecological views of 'health' of the biosphere 
of Dubos and other biologists, as affected by modern industrial- 
ization, should be considered, but only insofar as related to 
minerals supply. Fourth, we must consider f a v o r a b l e  externalities 
from minerals development and use, as well.* 
It is not a simple task to bring externalities into cost 
and benefit functions related to the increasing mineral scarcity 
hypotheses. Many adverse externalities do relate to energy or 
minerals production and supply and thereby scarcity--e.g. oil 
spills and steel mill stack discharges. But many others re- 
lated to energy or minerals product u s e s  do not--e.g. automobile 
tail pipe discharges or abandonment. In the flow chart,minerals 
supply terminates in Market I11 (Refined Minerals) or earlier. 
If we define our problemas increasing scarcity of mineral supply, 
then we should include all externality costs up to Market I11 
as chargeable to tke provision of minerals. Costs in Production 
IV and Market IV would not seem to be a cost of mineral supply. 
Consider nuclear devices, materials, and installations. One 
set of these is nuclear electric power plants. Another set is 
the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, thousands of tons of 
* See Dorfman, Gordon, Kneese, Krutilla, Smith, Fisher, Mishan, 
Peterson, Ridker, Schultze and many others. 
hot waste from weapons and research, thousands of military and 
research installations, ships, satellites, etc. The uranium 
production for electric power plants, their fuel and wastes, 
and their externalities should figure in appraisals of minerals 
(fuels) scarcity. The weapons related items should not. Further 
it is not certain whether externalities of providing uranium 
for weapon production should be charged as a cost of mineral 
supply - 
There has been a tendency of view the world's nuclear 
danger -- the Faustian dilemna -- as if it were a singular phe- 
nomenon due to pressure of growth on mineral fuel resources, 
mineral scarcity, and thereby the need for nuclear power. This 
is not so. The nuclear hazards would not disappear if we took 
all our electric power from the sun or fossil fuels. They are 
primarily rooted in weapons, international relations and de- 
clines in social control over violence. It could be argued 
that only the increment of nuclear hazard due to production of 
uranium and nuclear power is an externality of mineral supply. 
The question is complex. 
Similarly, today there is great interest in so-called 
'technology assessment'. Not all external costs from techno- 
logical changes result from efforts to overcome minerals 
scarcity, however. Some do, such as in strip mining and super 
tankers. Many of them in transportation, chemicals, pharmaceu- 
ticals, processed food, etc., do not. We noted that favorable 
as well as negative externalities should be appropriately in- 
cluded in mineral scarcity concepts and measures. Our benefit- 
cost measures should include, not only the damages from strip 
mining of coal, but also the lives saved which would otherwise 
be lost in underground mines; not only the transfer of mineral 
wealth from the developing to the developed countries, but also 
the transfer of capital and knowledge to the developing countries 
for mining activity. But not all favorable technology spill- 
overs should be credited to minerals. Nuclear production may 
save lives in hospitals, but this should not be credited to 
minerals supply. 
The externalities term is open-end. and ranging, particularly 
in long-term analysis. For example, it embraces the concept of 
intergenerational equity (see the quotations from Mitchell and 
Pigou in Scarcity and Growth), nature preservation (Krutilla, 
Fisher, Smith), theory of justice (Rawls, steady-state and 
entropy economics (Page, Boulding, Georgescu-Roegen, Daly), 
very long term (Meadows, futurists), quality of life (Mishan, 
Olsen, Barnett and Morse), and welfare economics generally. It 
is necessary to explore and clarify the externality concepts, 
for our purposes. The externalities concept has been over- 
extended and overused, in general. Further, most externalities 
are not significantly related to the concept of increasing 
economic scarcity of minerals. 
Cartels and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
Cartels and the thrust toward a NIEO is the second main 
social change of our generation relative to minerals. 
In Scarcity and Growth (Barnett and Morse), the geographic 
area was the United States proper. The increasing scarcity 
hypothesis related to domestic availability. Foreign trade was 
relevant only in moderating or intensifying demand pressures on 
domestic resource supply. This was and still is a relevant con- 
Tept. Countries are societal units. In the flow chart, there 
is an increase in economic scarcity of domestic minerals if 
production costs in mining or refining become more expensive 
(Production I1 and 111). 
As imports as well as the demands of foreign countries grow, 
however, the availability and scarcity of foreign supplies to 
meet world demands become important. A major escape for all 
nations has historically been access to the world's trading 
community. For our European analysis, we are thrust into world 
supply and, to a degree, world demands. Thus, if the cost terms 
of imports into Market I1 or I11 become more favorable, then the 
effect may be increased plenitude, whether or not domestic mineral 
resource costs were increasing. 
Conventionally in the past, restrictions by international 
minerals cartels were not viewed as significant elements in in- 
increasing mineral scarcity. They were not the scarcity of 
nature, and (except for diamonds) were never highly successful 
for a long period, anyway. But this has recently changed for 
oil and it may yet for other major significant minerals. In 
the 1970's government cartels and associations have attempted 
to make minerals increasingly scarce. Account must be taken of 
this influence on the statistical record. In the flow chart, 
this means explicit concern for the imports and exports to the 
left of Markets I1 and III.* 
The abruptness of the increase in petroleum scarcity has 
its own peculiar history. For more than half a century, into 
the 1970s, European and American companies discovered and 
developed petroleum resources at declining real costs in foreign 
places. The decline was very great; despite monopoly profits 
for the companies and host governments, prices fell by half or 
more. The situation was increasing plenitude; the cost to ex- 
plore, find, develop and produce Middle East oil was less than 
a dollar a barrel, sometimes as low as ten cents. America and 
other countries permitted themselves to become highly dependent 
on these cheap resources, rather than on their own less cheap 
but very plentiful energy resources. When the situation was 
well developed (the term is 'hooked' in the case of drugs), 
the OPEC cartel struck, being assisted by a favorable political 
climate. 
* See Adleman, Amuzegar, Barnett, Bergstem Fried, Moran, Vernon, 
Vogely and others. 
In addition to specific cartels, the New ~nternational 
Economic Order doctrines are changing access to foreign supplies. 
These complex developments and their eventual outcomes must be 
taken into account in modernized mineral scarcity analysis. 
Ownership, rates of development-and terms of trade are all sub- 
ject to radical change. Stable U.S. and European policies have 
yet to be developed. (See, for example, Gordon, Kaplan, Perlman, 
Tilton, Vernon, Stanley and others.) 
Two recent and interrelated developments are noteworthy: 
the relatively low propensity to invest in certain mining sectors 
and the shift of foreign investment from developing to developed 
countries. Due to the considerable time-lag between exploration 
and actual production, insufficient investment in the present 
may cause serious supply problems in the medium and long-term. 
The reluctance of the mining companies to invest might be 
caused partly by the uncertainties about expected growth rates 
in industrialized countries, which play an important role in 
determining future demand for and prices of minerals. This un- 
certainty, the low profit margins, and the often rising taxes 
force the mining firms to seek efficient production with huge 
plants and large-scale equipment. This has caused a sharp rise 
in investment costs of new capacity in mining industries. The 
financial requirements often exceed the capabilities of the 
mining firms, and external funding by commercial banks is, under 
these circumstances, difficult to obtain. 
Industrialized countries that depend mainly on foreign 
investment of domestic firms for their supply, have also to 
consider structural changes in their relations with developing 
countries. Many of these countries have successfully increased 
the control over exploitation of their national resources. 
Measures they have taken to increase participation of domestic 
firms have aggrevated the conditions under which foreign firms 
may operate. 
This, together with the risks of expropriation and political 
instability, make foreign investors more inclined to move to 
developed countries, where expansion costs are higher due to the 
remoteness and lower grade of deposits. Of course, this is in- 
crease in economicscarcity of minerals, but should,not be seen 
as increased p h y s i c a Z  scarcity. 
Further, the numerous nations of the Third and Fourth 
Worlds have extended their concepts of New International Economic 
Order to ocean resources. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations accepted in 1970 
(only Eastern Europe abstained) that the ocean resources are the 
"common heritage of mankind" and should be exploited under an 
international regime. The actual legislation, however, still 
has to be agreed upon within the framework of the U.N. Law of 
the Sea Conference. The developing countries agree that the 
economic benefits of the exploitation of manganese nodules should 
be shared by all states, but also demand that special consider- 
ation should be given to the particular needs of developing 
countries. An International Authority would ensure this, but 
would also limit seabed-production in order to protect the 
interests of land-based producers of the minerals concerned. 
These are mostly developing countries. The Western Nations, 
especially those which have the sophisticated technology 
needed for seabed-mining, are resisting such policies. They 
do not agree with cartel-like powers of the Authority and fear 
that production and profits of their commerical firms would be 
too severely limited. 
In summary, imports and the conditions under which they 
are obtained, are increasingly important in minerals supply. 
This is due to cartels, the NIEO, ocean resources, international 
interdependence, and (in some cases) depletions. For all 
nations, especially for Europe and Japan, mineral scarcity re- 
lates mainly to international mineral markets. 
VI. CONCEPTS FOR MEASUREMENT OF INCREASING ECONOMIC 
SCARCITY OF MINERALS. 
There is considerable literature on the measurement of 
scarcity. An early discussion appears in Scarcity and Growth, 
Part I11 (Barnett and Morse). More recently, there have been 
published discussions by Moroney, Nordhaus, Brown and Field, 
Smith, Fisher, Devarajan, Krutilla, Heal, Dasgupta, Randall, 
and others; see especially the articles and references in 
Scarcity and Growth fS+G) Reconsidered, 1979, ed. V.K. Smith, 
and the forthcoming Smith article in JournaZ of AgricuZturaZ 
Economics. Also see anRFF Conference volume and an NSF report 
by V.K. Smith and J. Krutilla, also forthcoming. Further dis- 
cussions have been presented in other papers. 
At a later time in our effort, we shall examine the liter- 
ature in detail and present our own survey, synopsis, and con- 
clusions with respect to the topic and literature. For the 
present, we refer the reader to the work cited above. 
Here we have a very modest purpose. We try to state the 
economic concepts relevant for measurement of the hypotheses 
of increasing economic scarcity of minerals. The context is a 
very practical, applied one. We hope to compile the data for 
particular minerals for European countries within the next year 
or so. The discussion here indicates guide-lines, difficulties, 
and uncertainties. 
Cost and prices per unit of minerals. 
During a particular period, one economic concept specifies 
whether mineral supply has become economically more or less 
scarce than before. This is the economic cost to supply the 
society with minerals or products thereof. 
To measure economic cost, we need a meaningful economic 
numeraire or yardstick. The appropriate numeraire, or value 
measure of economic cost, is the opportunity cost of mineral 
production. Below, we will consider these opportunity costs 
both: (1) in terms of labor (or labor plus capital) inputs needed 
to produce one unit of output; and (2) in terms of other goods, 
which might have been produced instead of minerals. We refer to 
the~e~respectively, as hypothesis and numeraire ( I ) ,  and hypothesis 
and numeraire (2), and discuss each in turn. 
The first possibility is the physical amounts of labor and 
capital which are required to produce a unit of net output* of 
minerals. Labor and capital are society's ultimate productive 
resources which, if applied to producing minerals in a period, 
are not available to produce other goods. The cost measures are 
labor cost per unit of minerals, or labor plus capital cost per 
unit of minerals. Symbolically, L/O or L+C/o. If we desire to 
add together units of labor and capital to get a single index 
of labor plus capital cost per unit of net minerals output, we 
weight the labor and capital input factors by relative importance. 
A former study (S and G, 1963, Barnett and Morse) showed that 
the average L+C costs per unit of minerals output [(L+C)+O] 
declined as follows in the U.S.A: 
Index 
This time series of labor plus capital cost per unit of output 
was brought up to 1970 by M. Johnson and F.W. Bell, and shows 
continued decline. (See S+G Revisited, 1974, Barnett). In the 
centuryperiodin the U.S.A., the amounts of labor and capital 
to produce a net unit of minerals output declined persistently. 
We can suggest a variant of this numeraire, still employing 
the concept of labor and capital cost as a yardstick of economic 
value. It is the comparison of changes in the prices per unit 
of each minerals, labour and capital. The concept here is that 
physical inputs of units of minerals, labor, and capital (putting 
aside other purchased materials) assembled appropriately, con- 
stitute the production functions whereby useful goods are pro- 
duced for societv. Raw materials, labor, and capital goods are 
the "scarce inputs" from which all goods flow, and each is paid a 
price equal to its marginal revenue productivity. When a factor 
of production becomes relatively scarce, its marginal productivity 
and price increase relatively. Thus, if minerals become in- 
creasingly scare relative to units of labor and capital, the 
price of minerals per unit will increase relative to the price 
of labor (wage rate) and price of capital goods (interest and 
depreciation rates related to cost of capital items). W. Nordhaus, 
G. Brown and B. Field have used this measure. Prices of major 
metals have fallen relative to wage rates in the U.S.A. over 
the long term; this would deny the scarcity hypothesis. 
* We say 'net output' in order to allow for (remove) the pro- 
ductivity of other factors of production, such as energy and 
other purchased materials. 
It is possible to criticize both variants of the foregoing 
labor and capital cost numeraire or yardstick for ascertaining 
whether there has been increase in minerals scarcity. The 
criticism is that opportunity cost of minerals production should 
be measured in terms of alternative economic goods foregone, for 
the following reasons. The productivity of labor and of capital 
are increasing in the economy generally, from favorable para- 
metric changes -- that is, favorable developments in technology, 
knowledge, social arrangements, etc. Therefore, it may be argued 
that cost of minerals, as measured by labor days or labor plus 
capital, does not truly measure opportunity cost, certainly not 
in terms of alternative economic goods foregone. The measuring 
unit, man-day of labor, is itself increasing in value due to 
socio-technical improvements in society, and the same holds for 
physical units of capital. It is true that it required only half 
as much L+C to get a unit of net mineral product in 1919 as in 
1870-1900, but the 1919 L+C were worth a good deal more in terms 
of productivity of other goods than earlier. Similarly, when we 
compare price of minerals with wage rates or costs of capital 
goods inputs, we are again overlooking that parametric changes 
have increased the productivities of both labor and capital 
units. They have become generally more valuable in the economy, 
in terms of capacity to produce intermediate and final goods, 
over time. 
This leads us to the second numeraire for measuring in- 
creasing (or decreasing) resource scarcity. It is that we use 
as a numeraire the opportunity cost of the minerals expressed 
directly in terms of manufactured and service goods foregone in 
order to produce the minerals. One way of doing this is to 
measure over time L or L+C cost to produce a unit of mineral 
goods relative to the L or L+C cost to produce a unit of non- 
extractive goods. Production of mineral goods differs from pro- 
duction of manufactured and service goods. The former relies 
on identified, depletable deposits, manufacturing and service 
rely less or not at all. Thus we measure 
where L, C, and 0 represent Labor, Capital, and net - Output in 
the Mineral and Non-mineral - sectors-of the economy. If this 
ratio increases, then cost per unit of minerals has increased 
relatively, and this represents increasing economic scarcity 
of minerals in terms ofopportunity cost in other goods. And 
vice versa. 
A variant of this second measure is to simply observe price 
per unit of minerals relative to price of other goods. Price is 
a summat.ion of the current market values of a22 the inputs re- 
required to obtain a unit of minerals products. Similarly, 
price measures the current market value of a22 the inputs to get 
a unit of non-mineral products. If the price of mineral product 
rises relative to other prices, then it must be because the 
current values of the inputs rose relatively. We emphasize that 
this price measure of relative mineral cost per unit over time 
embraces not only the quantities (Q) of labor, capital, and 
other inputs but also the effect of their unit prices (P) and 
of profits. That is, at any time, 
Price = Z [ (QL x PL) + (QC x PC) + (QI x PI) + IT] t 0 . 
The assumption which is made in use of the relative price 
measure is that price changes of factors of production (i.e. 
per unit of labor, capital and other inputs) operate equally in 
minerals relative to other sectors. In such a case the ratios 
to other prices at successive times reflect changes in quantities 
of inputs. 
In summary, these then are the two major indexes, and the 
variants in each, for our testing the hypotheses of increasing 
scarcity of minerals, over time: 
1. For the strong hypothesis of increasing scarcity (see below) 
the value numeraire is assumed to be the opportunity cost 
in terms of labor units or labor plus capital units con- 
sumed in ~hvsical terms. 
(a) Labor cost per unit of minerals output, or labor 
plus capital cost per unit of minerals output 
(b) Unit cost of minerals relative to unit cost of 
labor or of labor plus capital 
2. For the weak hypothesis of increasing scarcity the measure 
of value (numeraire) is assumed to be the opportunity cost 
A A 
in terms df the quantity of other goods foregone: 
a 
(a) Relative labor or labor plus capital cost per unit 
of minerals output 
[(L + C +OM] f [(LN + CN+ON)l M M 
(b) Price of minerals relative to prices of other goods 
The data problems -- units of measurement, index number 
construction, availability -- are discussed later. Numeraire 1 
and numeraire 2 are each appropriate to a particular hypothesis 
of mineral scarcity. Hypothesis and numeraire 1 refer to the 
classical economic doctrine of Malthus and Ricardo. Increase of 
population to the limits of subsistence, the iron law of wages 
and the niggardliness of Nature contrived to present much pro- 
gress. Economics was the 'dismal science'. A labor theory of 
value dominated markets. Agricultural activities and by impli- 
cation minerals were characterized by diminishing returns to 
social scale. In this situation, it would be sufficient to 
measure opportunity cost of minerals in labor man-days (or a 
similar index of labor plus capital). These are also the 
hypothesis and appropriate measure of resource scarcity of many 
contemporary reformers -- Ehrlich, Harden, Forrester, Meadows, 
Georgescu-Roegen, Daly, Dubos, Schumacher, etc. They have 
rediscovered or asserted certain elements of Malthus, Ricardo 
and Mill, more than a century ago. If, indeed, what J.S. Mill 
termed 'progress of civilization' (increasing productivity of 
factors of production due to favorable socio-technical change) 
were to cease, this form of the increasing resource scarcity 
hypothesis would be very relevant. The measures of numeraire 1 
would be the proper test. 
The second hypothesis and measures are more meaningful of 
modern economies. The opportunity cost of a unit of minerals 
is the volume of alternative goods which are given up, in the view 
of most present-day economists. 'Progress of civilization' is a 
built-in characteristic of modern economics,~ with persistent 
increase in productivities of the labor and capital factors of 
production, due to socio-technical progress. In this case, the 
appropriate concept of increasing resource scarcity and measures 
for testing it are found under hypothesis number 2. These 
measures would reveal whether natural resource scarcity exerts 
a retardation by comparing trends of improvements in productivity 
in natural resource sectors (in this case minerals) with trends 
in economic sectors which are less or not dependent on natural 
resources. The assumption is that socio-technical progress 
operates in both sectors. On this hypothesis of increasing 
scarcity of natural resources, there would be manifestations of 
increasing minerals scarcity only if minerals costs per unit 
rise r e l a t i v e  to other sectors of the economy. 
The measures 1 and 2 apply to different concepts. Numer- 
aire 1 and 2 apply to different concepts. Numeraire 1 is for 
a strong hypothesis of minerals scarcity where minerals exhibit 
diminishing returns to labor and capital, irrespective of economy- 
wide advances in productivity. Numeraire 2 is for a weak hypothesis 
of minerals scarcity, where productivity in fact advances in all 
sectors of the economy, but slower in minerals. If true, the 
strong hypothesis might call for strong policies -- like the birth 
and consumer controls of Ehrlich, Harden, Daly, etc. -- since 
the diminishing returns in natural resources would otherwise 
bring economic growth to a halt, and then to a decline. This 
hypothesis was a major element of the assumptions which drove the 
Club of Rome-Forrester-Meadows model of the early 70's t0.a 
'Crisis of Mankind' and doomsday predictions. 
The weak hypothesis of increasing scarcity, if true, of 
itself only connotes that economic growth might be slowed. It 
might call for modest policies --for example, more research and 
development in minerals sectors -- to raise the rate of technical 
progress in minerals relative to the level of manufacturing. Or 
it might justify no interventionist policies -- economic progress 
still continues even with slower productivity improvement in a 
relatively small economic sector like minerals. 
It is important to address both the strong and weak hypo- 
theses and their respective measures under 1 and 2. We think 
the weak hypothesis is more interesting and more likely to be 
valid. But the strong hypothesis is more prominent in public 
discussion, is more widely believed, and is more strongly pub- 
licized. Therefore, we are concerned with testing both hypo- 
theses. 
Concerning the variant measures within each hypothesis, we 
think they are all significantly legitimate in concept, but 
subject to varying defects in applied analysis. Each of the 
variants has problems of data availability; accuracy of measure- 
ment; index number construction; accounting for government 
interventions in markets and production functions; marginal vs. 
average information; etc. In light of the practical defects and 
limitations of each variant, it is desirable that we measure in 
more than one way. We may then use the varied data with their 
different perspectives and defects for more and better insight 
than if we had only a single one of the imperfect measures. Our 
interpretations and conclusions may be better, from the multiplicity 
of pieces of evidence, to be gathered by means of not only different 
measures, but also by testing the hypothesis at different pro- 
duction stages and markets. 
Especially in appraisal of the weak scarcity hypothesis, 
both of the measures in hypothesis 2, relative cost and relative 
price, are desirable techniques for testing. We offer an example. 
The cartel scarcity influence operates immediately on imports. 
The effect is visible in one, but not in the other, of the two 
major, alternative indicators of increasing scarcity. It does 
not soon appear in relative labor cost, and might not in rela- 
tive labor plus capital cost, but does immediately show in 
relative price. The relative cost measure is average cost of 
domestic production: 
The relative price indicator is PM+PN. International cartel 
behavior enters immediately into the latter(price) but not 
the former (average cost of production) . In this case, the 
two variant measures tell us different things, including in- 
formation on the increase in cartel returns. However, not all 
of the difference between the changes in the two indicators is 
due to the cartel. First, even in the absence of cartel, change 
in price tends to reflect change in marginal cost, as compared 
with change in average cost in the other indicator. Second, 
increases in import prices induce higher cost efforts in domestic 
supply, and also increase the returns to both capital and labor 
in domestic supply. 
Other Measures 
We have brief comments on several other measures which have 
been proposed for testing minerals scarcity hypotheses. Most 
are related to the unit cost measures, above. 
(a) Environmental Externalities: It was indicated earlier that 
many economists (including ourselves) have argued that, in test- 
ing the resource scarcity hypotheses, costs and price data of 
minerals should include the adverse spillovers or externalities, 
suchas stream pollution from coal mining. Further, until re- 
cently, price data did not include externalities, and even today 
they may not adequately. Therefore, past cost and price data 
have not included aZZ relevant costs. The criticism is correct. 
In our construction of data and interpreting them we shall try 
to take account of externalities. We shall be assisted by the 
fact that environmental protection costs have been increasingly 
internalized in prices and production functions during the past 
decade. 
J.Krutilla, A. Fisher, and V.K. Smith have, however, recently 
argued an even stronger environmental proposition. They state 
that internalizing observed environmental costs in present 
decision-making structures and processes of private enterprise 
are unlikely to capture all environmental costs. They state 
that so-called efficient economic decisions are biased to short- 
term welfare and the present and near generations in several ways. 
Such decisions overlook irreversibility -- e.g. destruction of 
biological species and natural wonders. Also, the interest rate 
which equilibrates present and future spending excessively dis- 
counts welfare of future populations, who are not yet in market. 
Further, markets are biased by wealth distribution. Still further, 
the relatively high income elasticity of demand for a relatively 
inelastic supply of natural resource, public amenity goods is 
not well represented in decisions on mutually exclusive use of 
nature for minerals for future individual nature-experience 
recreation. Others have also written on these matters, among 
them A. Kneese, E. Mishan, and T. Page. 
Earlier economists, back at least to J.S. Mill and including 
more recently A.C. Pigou and W.C. Mitchell (and even ourselves), 
have been concerned with environmental externalities questions. 
But mostly these concerns were of the nature that they could be 
handled by internalizing the externalities and manipulating the 
interest rate. The Krutilla, Fisher, Smith, Kneese, Mishan, Page, 
writings of the past decade are much stronger indictments of the 
market system. 
We hope to consider these issues sometime, and offered some 
preliminary thoughts in part I11 of this paper, above. The 
current project, however, does not permit serious consideration 
of these important, over-arching challenges; our object here is 
more conventional and limited. 
(b) The Marginal Supplier 
In concept,. the real cost of production per unit of output 
from marginal, long-term supply activities would be desirable as 
an indicator of increasing scarcity. That is, we seek to observe 
whether the dynamic, long-term marginal real cost curve is rising. 
If so, this is increasing scarcity. As noted, price data tend to 
reflect marginal cost, but aresubject to aberrations and noise. 
The marginal supplier's cost per unit would be a more sensitive 
indicator of resource scarcity than average cost and would also 
reveal some of the reasons for price movements and tendencies in 
resource scarcity. 
A difficulty, however, is that the marginal supplier is 
frequently a short-term supplier, bringing in idle, high-cost 
capacity in response to short-term market imbalances. Indeed, 
most short-term suppliers are of this nature. Our concern is 
with the marginal suppliers on a long-run supply curve. 
In minerals, it may be possible in some cases to distinguish 
marginal suppliers on the long-run supply curves. In iron ore, 
taconite has been in marginal supply for a long time, compilation 
of taconite cost data is possible. Interestingly, a recent study 
by Kakela indicates that iron from taconite is lower cost. It 
is stated to be more efficient in blast furnaces, economizing on 
fuel, capital, and labor per unit of iron output. In copper, 
the porphyries are the marginal suppliers in the long run. In 
aluminium, until further development of the enormous reserves 
of years of highest grade bauxite resources in West Africa., Brazil, 
and other places, perhaps Australia's lower grade bauxite is the 
world's marginal supply. In Europe, U.S. and Canada, various 
nonbauxite ores would become the marginal supply if world supply 
were cut off, but none of these are presently in commercial use. 
In petroleum, the present marginal supply in the United States 
is secondary and tertiary recovery. Such production is usually 
viewed as marginal supply short run; but it is also on the long- 
run curve. If 3 0  percent of an oil field is viewed as recover- 
able at a price of $ 3  a barrel, then clearly the percentage would 
be greatly expanded at $14 a barrel, and even more at $28. In- 
creased recovery percentages from oil pools certainly will be 
in the long-run supply curve, but at present prices such recovery 
will be planned in the development of the resource, rather than 
tacked on as a go-back activity. Possibly, marginal supply could 
be viewed as costs from fields just coming in, such as the North 
Sea,heavy crudes, or tar sands. 
The concept of long-term marginal supply is very well known 
in natural gas, from the U.S. Permian Basin case and subsequent 
multiprice regulations. Earlier, in World War 11, marginal supply 
at higher prices was used in price incentive schemes for metallic 
minerals; frequently short-term marginal supply was induced more 
than long term. 
I n  t h e o r y ,  changes i n  long-term marg ina l  supp ly  c o s t  would 
be a  f i n e  measure f o r  t e s t i n g  bo th  s t r o n g  and weak hypotheses  
of  i n c r e a s i n g  r e s o u r c e  s c a r c i t y .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  i n  a  dynamic, 
r a p i d l y  changing wor ld ,  t h e  d a t a  problems a r e  ve ry  g r e a t  and may 
be i n s u p e r a b l e .  
F i s h e r  and Devara jan  (1979) have r e c e n t l y  sugges t ed  d i s -  
covery  c o s t  a s  a  measure of  i n c r e a s i n g  s c a r c i t y .  T h i s  would be 
r e l a t e d  t o  c o s t  o f  t h e  marg ina l  u n i t s  of  supp ly .  W e  s h a l l  look 
i n t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  d a t a  f o r  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on e x p l o r a t i o n  
can be compiled and r e l a t e d  t o  d i s c o v e r i e s .  Beyond t h i s ,  F i s h e r  
and Devarajan have su g g es t ed  i n  t h e  a r t i c l e  t h e  u s e  o f  d i s cove ry  
c o s t  a s  a  proxy f o r  economic r e n t ,  t o  t e s t  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  mine ra l  
s c a r c i t y .  On c e r t a i n  assumpt ions  t h e y  observed t h a t  d i s c o v e r y  
e f f o r t s  t o  p r o cu r e  a d d i t i o n a l  m i n e r a l s  would be under taken  t o  
t h e  p o i n t  where e x p e n d i t u r e  p e r  u n i t  o f  s t a n d a r d  e f f i c i e n c y  
m i n e r a l s  would ( a f t e r  a l l owing  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s )  be e q u a l  t o  
t h e  economic r e n t  which would have t o  be p a i d  f o r  a  u n i t  o f  
s t a n d a r d  m i n e r a l s  i n  a b s e n c e o f d i s c o v e r y .  W e  d i s c u s s  economic 
r e n t  below. 
( c )  I n c r e a s e s  i n  Economic Rent 
It i s  f r e q u e n t l y  proposed t h a t  w e  t e s t  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  r e s o u r c e  
s c a r c i t y  by o b se r v i n g  changes  i n  economic r e n t .  The s o u r c e s  of  
t h e  concep t  a r e  Mal thus ian  o r  R i ca rd i an  long-run,  s t a t i c  t h e o r y  
f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l an d .  I n  a  Mal thus ian  c a s e ,  l a n d  i s  c o n s t a n t  
q u a l i t y  b u t  a t  E l  it i s  f u l l y  u t i l i z e d ,  and beyond t h a t  p o i n t  
must be c u l t i v a t e d  more and more i n t e n s i v e l y ,  a t  r i s i n g  u n i t  c o s t .  
I n  a  R i ca r d i an  c a s e ,  more l a n d  i s  a v a i l a b l e  beyond E l ,  b u t  
it is  of  monoton ica l ly  d e c l i n i n g  economic q u a l i t y ,  and c u l t i v a t i o n  
beyond t h a t  p o i n t  i s  a t  a  r i s i n g  u n i t  c o s t  f o r  t h e  p roduc t .  Land 
i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by o r i g i n a l  and i n d e s t r u c t a b l e  a t t r i b u t e s .  A t  
t i m e  1  r e n t  i s  z e r o .  A t  t i m e  2, demand h a s  grown t o  D2 and r e n t  
i s  t h e  shaded a r e a  P2E2Plr which measures s c a r c i t y  e f f e c t .  A t  
t ime  3 ,  r e n t  h a s  grown t o  P3E3P1; t h e  i n c r e a s e  from t i m e  2  i s  
t h e  i n c r e a s e d  s c a r c i t y  e f f e c t .  
I f  t h e  world conformed t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  pa ra -  
m e t r i c a l l y  i n v a r i a n t ,  no-dep le t ion  models ,  i n c r e a s e s  i n  economic 
r e n t  would r e f l e c t  i n c r e a s i n g  p h y s i c a l  r e s o u r c e  s c a r c i t y ,  and 
n o t h i n g  else.  Assume f o r  example, t h e  R ica rd i an  model where un- 
homogenous r e s o u r c e s  a r e  f r e e  goods u n t i l  p r o d u c t i v e .  Then t h e  
r e n t  of  s t a n d a r d  r e s o u r c e s  would always e q u a l  t h e  c o s t  o f  con- 
v e r t i n g  marg ina l  q u a l i t y  r e s o u r c e s  t o  b e s t  q u a l i t y ,  and would be 
a  p r e c i s e  i n d ex  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  p h y s i c a l  s c a r c i t y . t h a t  had 
o c c u r r e d  from t h e  beg inn ing  of  man's  economic h i s t o r y .  
However, there will be many types of best quality re- 
sources; therefore, there will be many different figures for 
rent; and, for institutional reasons, unhomogenous resources 
(including those at the margin) command a reservation price in 
private enterprise societies. Rent will now contain a pecuniary 
element that reflects, but does not measure, increasing scarcity; 
and there will be no single figure for rent -- it will be 
different for each type of resource. As scarcity increases, 
rents will increase, and rents will also change as the result 
of changes in general price levels, interest rates, relative 
demands, and expectations concerning future resource avail- 
ability. Under these conditions, advances in rent on un- 
homogenous resources are an ambiguous indicator of increases 
in scarcity. 
A further difficulty with economic rent as an indicator 
of increasing scarcity iscompelling in the case of depletable 
minerals resources. As the best resources are used up, they 
disappear from the left-hand portion of the supply curves, and 
so do the economic rent areas. At the time that Mesabi range 
hematite ore is exhausted and ~esabi taconite is used, the only 
visible rent could be the differences among taconites. The 
magnitudes of economic rents at successive dates would not 
measure long term increase in scarcity; only the period would 
be covered in which at least two qualities were available. 
Rent would be a useful indicator of increasing scarcity 
in a Ricardian no-depletion world where the resource conversion 
path for employment of declining quality resources stayed put, 
and the process of growth involved nothing more complicated 
than a systematic transversal of the path. But in a world of 
depletion, of variable reservation prices and degrees of reser- 
vation, and especially of sociotechnical change, this is no 
longer so. The conversion path changes shape and position, with 
the result that quality differences among resources, their rank 
in the quality spectrum and, therefore, the rents that they earn 
vary irregularly over time. Rents on different resources will 
disappear, decrease or increase as a result of the depletion 
and economic reordering of resources, of changes in resource 
economizing behavior, of changes in the technical or social para- 
meters that determine the rank of resources, in order of economic 
quality. Because of these changes in the resource quality spec- 
trum which are induced by sociotechnical change, depletion, and 
so on, economic rent is not an operational empirical datum in the 
modern world. The changes cause capital gains and losses and a 
variety of income elements to be blended with economic rent and 
make its determination as a measure of increasing mineral scarcity 
practically impossible. 
We tentatively conclude as follows. First, Ricardian 
economic rent is a great seminal concept and a rigorous one in 
constrained static theory. It is not a dynamic concept in a 
society with technical change, depletion, inflation, and great 
varieties of resources. Second, we have not yet found it prac- 
tical to measure economic rent changes in order to measure or 
test the increasing scarcity hypotheses for various mineral 
resources. 
Finally, some of our colleagues are strongly attracted by 
the rigor of the rent concept in economic theory, among them; 
Brown, Devarajan, Field, Fisher, Krutilla and Smith. They are 
also more optimistic about measuring rent in a relevant and 
useful way. We hope this is so, and would be happy to join 
them in the measurement and use. 
VII. SEARCH FOR DATA IN MINERAL SUPPLIES FOR EUROPE 
Our initial foci are the following countries and minerals: 
Western Europe: Belgium, France, FRG, Italy, Netherlands, 
U.K., Spain, Sweden. 
Eastern Europe: GDR, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, USSR. 
Minerals: a) Petroleum, natural gas, coal. 
b) Iron, manganese, chromium, cobalt, aluminium, 
copper, lead, nickel, zinc, tin. 
c) Phosphate rock, potash. 
(In addition, we are compiling economic time series for regions, 
other countries, and other minerals, where such data are readily 
available in library publications.) 
Production I. Findinq Reserves and Related Markets 
We repeat the upper portion of the flow chart previously 
presented. It will be remembered that our need is for data on 
minerals prices, labor (and capital) inputs, mineral outputs, 
and labor (plus capital) cost of output. We need time-series 
data, so that we can observe whether or not minerals costs in- 
creased. 
Market A.prices are usually not available in useful form. 
Companies do bid for North Sea oil and gas drilling rights but 
the bids are not really prices. They are rather complicated 
agreements concerning percentages to the drilling company and 
host government, taxes, etc., and do not help us. U.S. type 
data would be more useful for us -- they are lease bonus bids 
in money terms, plus a royalty agreement. But even here, this 
is the price for the privilege of drilling a particular area 
not price per barrel of reserves found. 
Also, we do not see any promising price data series in 
Market A for the other minerals. 
In Production I: Exploration/Finding Efforts, expenditures 
and perhaps breakdowns of data into labor, capital, and other 
outlays are possibly available for much of the North Sea oil and 
gas exploration. If we could get time series data on these and 
on quantities of reserves found (which are the "output" of 
Stage I), we could try to observe trends; of course the money 
figures would have to be deflated by appropriate price indexes. 
Speaking practically, however, this avenue is not useful 
for our purposes at this time. In oil and gas, the period since 
the beginning of the North Sea development is far too short. We 
might have more luck with some of the other minerals, in observ- 
ing expenditure or input effort data relative to reserves found. 
The better sources would be governmental departments of mines 
and geology, major companies, and trade associations and journals. 
Market I. At this time we do not know whether sufficient 
identified, quantified reserves have been sold and reported 
publicly in Europe to help us; we would need data over periods 
of time. We are not hopeful. If we did find price data, we 
would have to deflate them appropriately. 
In summary, Production I and related markets are not prime 
targets for data with which to test hypotheses concerning in- 
creasing mineral scarcity, except in special situations. One 
special situation, possibly, is when great new reserves are 
found, like North Sea oil and gas. Another one is when major 
reserves are mined out and others have not been found. Even 
these, however, are qualitative indicators -- incomplete and 
possibly misleading. Good data on reserves found and their 
economic characteristics are rarely available. Also, by them- 
selves, magnitudes of reserves do not answer the questions we 
have asked. In fact, also oil is more scarce in Europe in the 
1970ts, despite North Sea finds because of OPEC led price in- 
creases. The test for increasing economic scarcity, we must 
emphasize,is that mineral supplies become economically more 
costly through time, relative to demands. If we can get good 
evidence of this, then qualitative evidence on reserve funds/ 
exhaustion become extremely useful in interpretation of the 
reasons, significance and implications. For example, USA with- 
drawal of major lands for availability for mineral exploration 
does not demonstrate increasing economic scarcity; but if in- 
creasing economic scarcity is ascertained from price or other 
cost data, then we can turn to land withdrawals evidence for 
possible explanation. 
Production I1 and Market 11: Mining and Supply of Minerals 
and Concentrates. 
This is the stage which is most promising for ascertaining 
possible increasing economic scarcity due to physical and certain 
other limitations. 
Prices. Price data are available in Market I1 from several 
sources. One is world markets -- quotations from London, New York, 
and elsewhere. Another source is customs data related to imports 
and exports. Still a third, for some commodities, is internal 
country price quotations. The data are for identified commodities. 
Note some problems: 
(a) Which price series should be used? For a single commodity, 
there will be multiple grades for virtually all minerals; 
and even for a single grade, there maybealternative price 
series. For example, tin quotations of pure tin (99.9%); 
standard tin (min. 99,75%); high grade tin (min. 99.85%) 
in the U.S., the London Metal Exchange, and Hamburg. 
(b) Which price deflators should be used? The problem is 
very serious in periods of major price change like the 
1970's. For example, the U.K. wholesale price indexes 
for 1977 (1970=100) range from (358 for basic materials), 
260 for finished goods to 241 for textiles. The consumer 
price index for 1977 was 249. 
(c) In some cases, the bulk of the trading is in long-term 
contracts or intra-company transfers, which may differ 
substantially from prices in spot markets. Bauxite has 
been one example. 
(d) Short term price movements in some minerals are extreme, 
much more so than in deflators. It is difficult to as- 
certain 'trend' for relatively short periods like a decade 
or so. For example, assume we look at the price change 
since 1970,LME copper price was E444 per L ton in 1971, 
£878 in 1974, £556 in 1975, £780 in 1976, etc. 
(e) If we are interested in all minerals, or groups, we must 
aggregate into indexes. 
If a country is engaged in mining itself, then it would be 
very desirable to be able to ascertain price per unit of domestic 
production (related to domestic costs), separately from import 
price. In a free market economy, the prices tend to converge. 
It will be recalled that one can compare the price of 
mineral with the price of labor, to compare their scarcity, 
relative to the strong hypothesis. This can be readily done 
for most of the countries. 
Factor cost. Turn now to the other major variant for 
testing increasing resource scarcity -- labor or labor plus 
capital per unit of output. Such time series can be compiled, 
subject to limitations. For most countries, there are pub- 
lished data on numbers of workers and output for the overall 
mining industry. For some countries we can compile these data 
for up to four or five mining groups -- petroleum and gas, coal, 
metal mining (sometimes ferrous versus nonferrous) and non- 
metallic mining -- but the data will be subject to more error 
than for total mining. Capital input data for mining are not 
available for most countries, so the best we can do is to use 
time series on labor cost of mining output. 
We try to remove the contribution of purchased inputs other 
than capital and labor by weighting the physical output index 
numbers by value added or labor; or by computing output in the 
first place from value added data in constant national prices. 
Deflated value added data are usually inferior to weighted 
~hysical output index numbers; this is especially true during 
periods of substantial price changes. 
Price and Factor Cost. Each of the measures -- prices and 
labor cost -- has defects and virtues. Prices are commodity 
and grade specific and are available in the press. Under certain 
limited circumstances they may indicate marginal cost of domestic 
suppliers. In Europe, however, they tend to be world market 
prices, sometimes very different from domestic or foreign marginal 
cost. 
Labor cost per unit of minerals output relates to the whole 
mining industry. Data are compiled by government bureaus from 
censuses, surveys or estimates; and depict d o m e s t i c  industry. 
They show a v e r a g e  labor cost per unit of minerals, rather than 
marginal. Capital input data are scarce. 
More evidence can be offered with both sets of data than 
with one. Moreover, considerably more can be said in interpretation 
of what has occurred, since price trends tend to be world market 
supplies for import, while labor or labor plus capital cost data 
represent domestic circumstances. It is useful to compare evi- 
dence from domestic production with that of net imports. Also, 
in some cases it is possible to distinguish sources of import 
supplies, and this is further enlightening. 
Production I11 and Market 111: Supply of Refined Products. 
In general, the discussion just presented concerning Stage I1 
applies also to production of refined petroleum products, steel, 
aluminium, copper, fertilizers, etc. 
Prices. Good price data are available. The volumes of inter- 
national trade are relatively larger. Standardization of products 
is greater than for crude minerals. The prices are product-specific. 
Price quotations are plentiful. There are relatively more arms- 
length inter-company sales. The open market places accounts for 
more of the transactions. Im summary, strong market evidence con- 
cerning prices of standard commodities can be expected here, and 
price statistics will be good relative to the scarcity hypothesis, 
after deflation. 
However, interpretation of the price data may be more dif- 
ficult than for crude minerals. The extent of manufacturing value 
added relative to cost of finding and mining reserves is much 
greater for certain minerals. That is, most of the price of re- 
fined metals and fertilizers is manufacturing activity, rather 
than minerals cost. To the extent that the scarcity hypotheses 
rely upon physical limits, depletion, location concentrations, 
producer country agreements, etc., the evidence in refined 
minerals prices has been attenuated or diffused.  his problem 
does not apply significantly to petroleum, gas and coal. Most 
of their value, even when sold in refined form is that of mineral 
finding and production. 
In summary, price evidence is very ample andof good 
quality, better than that of crude minerals. It is, however, 
the evidence of both the mineral production and early manu- 
facture, and must be interpreted with this in mind. Moreover, 
in European countries, indigenous production of refined mineral 
products is much larger relative to imports than for crude 
minerals. Indeed some European countries are major exporters. 
It is very convenient, and also meaningful, to compare the 
price of the refined mineral with the price (wage rate) of 
labor in manufacturing or in the economy. Both labor and the 
refined mineral are major inputs to the manufacturing, con- 
struction, service, and consumer sectors of the economy. If 
relative mineral price rises relative to the wage rate, this 
would be evidence of increasing scarcity, relative to the strong 
hypothesis. And vice versa. 
Factor Costs. We consider, now, the other major variant, 
labor or labor plus capital cost per unit of net output. Again, 
the situation is relatively favorable for measurement. Petroleum 
refining, ferrous metals, nonferrousmetals,and non-metallic, 
non-fuel mineral products are usually major production categories. 
More often than for crude mineral categories, these breakdowns 
are distinguished in the national statistics of European countries. 
Somewhat more often than for crude minerals, the employment in 
the refined mineral categories is broken down. Production indexes 
of the outputs are sometimes more reliable. This favorably 
affects our ability to measure labor or labor plus capital input 
per unit of net output. 
However, as was true of price evidence for refined minerals, 
the ratio L or (L+C) to net output will be more influenced by 
manufacturing costs than cost of finding reserves and producing 
from them. Interpreting evidence will not be easy. 
Production IV: Non-Minerals Production, Consumption and 
Markets. 
This stage and these markets are our reference portion of 
the economy -- 10 to 20 times as large as the aggregate minerals 
sector -- against which mineral costs and price data are viewed 
relatively. The Stage IV activities thus include the effects 
of what happens in minerals, but these are far outweighed by 
what happens in the rest of the economy. 
We could manipulate the Stage IV data to remove minerals 
from it, but this seems unnecessary. For example, assume that 
a minerals price index went from 100 to 150 from t to t+l, the 
prices of all goods were unchanged, and therefore we observed 
that the relative price index of increasing mineral scarcity 
was 
Assume minerals were 10% of the economy at t+l. Then, in fact, 
it must have been the case that: 
t t+l weight t+l 
weighted 
- 
index 
Non minerals 
Minerals 
All products 
We solve for the non-minerals index at t+l, and find that it 
equals 94.4. Therefore, the true relative price of minerals is 
150/94.4 = 159. This compares with the relative index of 
150/100 = 150, which we found by comparing mineral price changes 
with the whole economy. 
We find it more convenient to compare minerals with the 
total economy, rather than to follow the stronger logic of com- 
paring mutually exclusive categories. The distortion is small, 
particularly in the light of other data defects, and does not 
affect conclusions. 
Price Deflators and Foreiqn Exchanqe Rates 
We have already indicated that this is a major problem. 
The time series of prices allhave to be deflated. Especially 
in the 1970's. Many governments have given priority to un- 
employment abatement, social security systems, etc., and spent 
more than their revenues. Together with other causes consider- 
able and world-wide inflation has been the result. In most cases, 
it is not possible to look at mineral price series and say its 
movements primarily relate to supply scarcity. Also, output 
indexes are contrived in part by deflating data on values, so 
our measures of labor cost per unit of mineral output are affected. 
Unfortunately, respectable price deflator series are numerous 
and divergent in movements. Each has its own special definitions 
and meaning and differ from country to country. Should a deflator 
series for mineral price be -- of other materials; of the Gross 
Domestic Product; of consumer prices; of prices ininternational 
markets where exports are sold; of domestic prices; of U.S. prices 
from whom a major volume of imports come? Of four deflator series 
which the World Bank considers major relative to international 
trade in mineral products, the increase levels from the 1970 index 
base of 100 to the year 1978 are as follows: 166, 190, 252, 268: 
Moreover, there is the further problem of foreign exchange 
rates, which we have not yet mentioned. Foreign mineral products 
are usually brought in dollar or pound sterlingpric~s,by offer 
of the countries' foreign exchange. The trend of real cost of 
minerals to the purchasing country depends heavily on the price 
movements of its money relative to the dollar, and not merely 
on price movements of GDP, manufactured goods, consumer prices, 
or whatever other deflator is being considered. 
I n  summary, o u r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  p r i c e  t r e n d s  r e l a t i v e  t o  
t h e  s c a r c i t y  h y p o t h e s i s  canno t  be  s i m p l e ,  i n  view of OPEC, world-  
wide i n f l a t i o n ,  wide p r i c e  movements, and s u b s t a n t i a l  changes  
i n  f o r e i g n  exchange rates i n  t h e  p e r i o d  of  t h e  1 9 7 0 t s ,  which 
p r i m a r i l y  i n t e r e s t  u s .  
